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Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eaves-
dropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength dependent coupling ratio of the
fiber beam splitter. Utilizing this loophole, the eavesdropper can vary the transmittances of the fiber beam split-
ter at the receiver’s side by inserting lights with wavelengths different from what is normally used. Here, we
propose a wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system using homo-
dyne detection. By inserting light pulses at different wavelengths, this attack allows the eavesdropper to bias
the shot noise estimation even if it is done in real time. Based on experimental data, we discuss the feasibility
of this attack and suggest a prevention scheme by improving the previously proposed countermeasures.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a technology that
provides a practical way to distribute a secret key between two
distant parties using quantum physics and without making any
assumptions on a potential eavesdropper’s power. Such a level
of theoretical security cannot be achieved using classical pro-
tocols. Recently, the study of the practical security of QKD
systems [2] has attracted a lot of interest from the scientific
community (see for example, [3–11]). Indeed, deviations be-
tween the theoretical description of a QKD protocol and its
implementation, open security loopholes that can be exploited
by an eavesdropper. Demonstrations of partial or full eaves-
dropping against commercial discrete-variable QKD systems
have been performed [4, 5]. So far such hacking attacks were
compiled on discrete variable systems as they were the only
ones available at that time.
However, recently a commercial QKD system using contin-
uous variables (CV) [12], that features secure distances [13]
comparable to commercial discrete-variable QKD systems,
was released [14]. While the theoretical security of CV-QKD
protocols has been established [12, 15–17], the study of prac-
tical security of CV-QKD devices is far from sufficient (see
for example, [18–23]). This is mostly due to the relative youth
of the technology. Recent work includes the extension from
discrete-variable QKD to CV-QKD of an attack (and solu-
tion) that exploits the wavelength dependency of fiber beam
splitters [11, 23, 24]. However, this attack was limited to the
case where Bob performs heterodyne detection, i.e., he mea-
sures both quadratures of the electromagnetic field simulta-
neously [25]. In this paper, we propose another wavelength
∗yinzheqi@mail.ustc.edu.cn
†wshuang@ustc.edu.cn
dependency attack (along with a solution) but this time one
that can be applied to a CV-QKD system using homodyne
detection. Such a system also corresponds to those that are
currently commercially available [14].
In Ref. [26], an attack targeting the local oscillator calibra-
tion routine of a CV-QKD system was proposed together with
a family of countermeasures that consisted in measuring the
shot noise in real time. We propose and provide experimental
evidence of a wavelength attack targeting the real-time shot
noise measurement procedure proposed in Ref. [26]. By in-
serting light pulses at different wavelengths, this attack allows
the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation even if it is
done in real time. Based on experimental evidence, we discuss
the feasibility of this attack and suggest a prevention scheme
by improving the previously proposed countermeasures.
In Sec. II, we first recall the basics of a CV-QKD scheme
based on a Gaussian modulation of coherent states and homo-
dyne detection. We present in detail how the relevant quan-
tities, used to estimate the secret key rate of the protocol, are
computed and tackle the problem of the shot noise evaluation
procedure. Then, we give the principle of the attack proposed
in [26] and the associated countermeasures. In Sec. III, we ex-
plain how the wavelength dependency of the fiber beam split-
ter at the receiver’s side can be exploited to bypass the real-
time shot noise measurement countermeasure and detail the
various steps of our attack. In Sec. IV, we study the practical
feasibility of our scheme based on experimental values. Fi-
nally, we show in Sec. V how to improve the real-time shot
noise measurement technique in order to detect our attack.
The conclusion is given in Sec. VI.
2II. BACKGROUND
A. CV-QKD using homodyne detection
A typical CV-QKD system using homodyne detection [13]
can be realized using the schematic given in Fig. 1. In this
scheme, the weak signal and strong local oscillator are gen-
erated from the same coherent state pulse by a 1 : 99 beam
splitter. The signal is then modulated randomly following a
Gaussian distribution with variance VA and zero mean in both
quadratures, by using phase and amplitude modulators. The
signal and local oscillator are separated in time and modulated
into orthogonal polarizations using a polarization beam split-
ter before being inserted into the channel. When these pulses
arrive at Bob’s side, Bob randomly selects φ = 0 or φ = pi/2
in order to measure either the Xˆ or Pˆ quadrature, respectively.
After measuring, either direct or reverse error reconciliation
(alternatively, postselection) protocols are performed in order
to recover a common shared key. This is then followed by pri-
vacy amplification to reduce the eavesdropper’s (Eve) knowl-
edge to an arbitrary small amount [2, 12].
FIG. 1: (Color online) A simplified schematic of the homodyne pro-
tocol scheme in Ref. [13]. LO: local oscillator; PM: Phase modu-
lator; AM: amplitude modulator; PC: polarization controller; PBS:
polarization beam splitter; D1, D2 and Dtest: detectors; φ: phase
modulator with φ = 0 or pi/2; (1:99), (10:90) and (50:50): beam
splitters (reflectivity:transmittance).
B. Homodyne detection and the local oscillator calibration
attack
Homodyne detection plays a key role in CV-QKD imple-
mentations. To illustrate the new wavelength attack scheme,
let us first review the physical description of the homodyne
detection. Note that a more detailed explanation can be found
in Appendix A. Here we assume that both the signal and the
local oscillator are coherent states. The signal state is denoted
as αs and the local oscillator is denoted as αLO. The specific
quadrature of the signal is related to Bob’s modulated phase φ
and the substraction of the detector outcomes [27]. This can
be expressed as
δˆi = iˆ1 − iˆ2 = √ηαLO(Xφ + δXˆφ). (1)
Here iˆ1 and iˆ2 are the photocurrents recorded by detector 1
and detector 2, respectively; η is the efficiency of the detec-
tors; Xφ ≡ αse−iφ + α∗seiφ is the quadrature of the signal
and δXˆφ ≡ δαˆse−iφ + δαˆ†seiφ is the quadrature of the vac-
uum state. When φ = 0, X0 ≡ X = αs + α∗s and when
φ = pi/2, Xpi/2 ≡ P = i(α∗s − αs).
A clock signal, which is generated by the local oscillator in
a practical CV-QKD system (see Fig. 1), is necessary for max-
imizing the output of the homodyne detection. However, it
opens a potential loophole for the eavesdropper. In Ref. [26],
the local oscillator calibration attack was proposed, in which
Eve modifies the shape of the local oscillator pulse in order to
induce a delay to the clock trigger. As a result, the homodyne
detection outcome will drop down after such a delay due to
the circuit design, which results in a decrease of the detection
response slope, i.e., between the variance of the homodyne
measurement and the local oscillator power. The value of the
shot noise will be overestimated and consequently the excess
noise present will be underestimated. Hence, Eve’s presence
will be underestimated.
To prevent this attack, Bob can apply real-time shot noise
measurements, which consists of two types of implementa-
tions [26]. In this paper, we concentrate on the first one as
shown in Fig. 2. In this scheme, an amplitude modulator is
added on the signal path. Bob randomly applies attenuation
ratios r1 ≈ 0 and r2 ≈ 1 by the amplitude modulator to mea-
sure the shot noise level in real time. The measurement results
will be directly used to estimate the shot noise in the data pro-
cessing that follows.
FIG. 2: (Color online) Real-time shot noise measurement as pro-
posed in Ref. [26]. Here r1 and r2 denote the attenuation ratios ap-
plied on the signal path by the amplitude modulator. See text for
more details.
C. Fused biconical taper beam splitter
Fiber beam splitters are one of the key components in an
all-fiber QKD system. The most widely used technology in
making fiber beam splitters is the so-called fused biconical ta-
per technology [28, 29]. As is described in Ref. [11], the cou-
pling ratio of fused biconical taper beam splitter varies with
the wavelength of the input light.
For sufficing different requirements, there are three types
of fused biconical taper beam splitters: the single wavelength
type, the wavelength flatten type and the double wavelength
type. Compared to the first two, the double wavelength type
fused biconical taper beam splitter is more popular commer-
cially because of its relatively stable performance in a wide
3wavelength range. Even so, it does not mean that it is to-
tally wavelength independent. We experimentally tested two
double wavelength type 10 : 90 (reflection/transmittance) and
a 50 : 50 fused biconical taper beam splitter in our labora-
tory [30]. The relationship between their coupling ratios and
wavelengths is shown in Table I.
λ(nm) 1270 1290 1310 1330 1350 1370
T (10 : 90 BS) 0.9050 0.9066 0.9020 0.8978 0.9014 0.8991
T (50 : 50 BS) 0.5327 0.5253 0.5144 0.5052 0.5011 0.4965
λ(nm) 1390 1410 1430 1450 1470 1490
T (10 : 90 BS) 0.8985 0.8938 0.8940 0.8985 0.8989 0.8985
T (50 : 50 BS) 0.4931 0.4862 0.4902 0.4885 0.4908 0.4873
λ(nm) 1510 1530 1550 1570 1590 1610
T (10 : 90 BS) 0.9012 0.8995 0.8956 0.9026 0.9022 0.9060
T (50 : 50 BS) 0.4954 0.4960 0.5012 0.5069 0.5155 0.5265
TABLE I: The transmittance T of Thorlabs [30] double wavelength
type 10 : 90 beam splitter and a 50 : 50 beam splitter under different
wavelengths λ (nm).
III. HACKING HOMODYNE DETECTION SYSTEMS
In this section, a hacking scheme on a CV-QKD system us-
ing homodyne detection is proposed. Before introducing our
scheme, two facts should be noted. First, in the improved CV-
QKD scheme shown in Fig. 2, Bob does not need to measure
the intensity of the local oscillator because the shot noise level
can be directly measured in real time. On the other hand, very
low light intensity is enough to trigger the clock [26]. In this
case, Eve can hack the system by only utilizing the wavelength
dependent character of the fused biconical taper beam splitter.
A full wavelength attack scheme is proposed for this situation.
Moreover, even if Bob monitors the local oscillator intensity,
by combining the local oscillator calibration attack [26] with
the wavelength attack idea, Eve can still successfully achieve
all of the secure key information without being discovered.
Our attack scheme can be divided into two parts: Attack Part
1 and Attack Part 2.
A. Attack Part 1
In this attack Eve performs a full intercept-resend attack.
For this purpose, she measures the information sent from Al-
ice by performing heterodyne detection on both the signal and
the local oscillator. After which she obtains two quadrature
values XE and PE . According to these measurement results,
she prepares a new signal and local oscillator and sends them
to Bob. In this stage, two strategies can be used.
Strategy A: Suppose that Bob does not monitor the local
oscillator intensity. Instead of preparing a signal state of am-
plitude αE =
√
ηch(XE + iPE)/2 along with a local oscilla-
tor of amplitude αLO as in the regular intercept-resend attack,
Eve chooses a real number N larger than 1 and prepares a
signal state of amplitude
√
NαE =
√
Nηch(XE + iPE)/2
along with a local oscillator of amplitude αLO/
√
N . The
pulses are separated in time and orthogonal polarizations, as
the original pulses were, and then sent onto Bob. In this
strategy, Bob measures the quadratures with a variance of
ηηch(VA + 2N0) + N0/N + ηηchξN0 + vel and a realistic
shot noise of N0/N , where ξ is the excess noise in units of
N0, and N0 = ηα2LO (see Appendix A for details) is the shot
noise variance without the attack. The excess noise Bob esti-
mates is equal to [2+ (1/N − 1)/ηηch+ ξ]N0 [26]. If he still
uses N0 as the shot noise unit, the excess noise he estimates
can be made arbitrarily close to zero for certain channel effi-
ciencies by choosing the proper N . For instance, by choosing
typical values such as ξ = 0.1, η = 0.5 [26] and N = 10,
the excess noise estimated by Bob is (2.1 − 1.8/ηch)N0. It
reaches zero when ηch = 0.857, corresponding to 0.67 dB
loss or about 3.35 km of optical fiber link (with loss assumed
to be 0.2 dB/km). Thus entirely compromising the security of
the protocol.
Strategy B: Suppose that Bob monitors the local oscillator
intensity and its linear relation with the shot noise. And Eve
performs the local oscillator calibration attack as proposed in
Ref. [26]. In this strategy, Eve controls the slope of the homo-
dyne detection response by calibrating the trigger time. Ac-
cording to the analysis in [26], the excess noise estimated by
Alice and Bob is close to zero when the realistic shot noise is
reduced by 2/3 of the original level and ηch = 0.5.
Both of these strategies alone can not pass the protection
test proposed in Ref. [26] (Fig. 2). Under this technique, Bob
can easily monitor the shot noise level in real time, therefore
he can modify the parameters immediately to fully protect
against the above attacks. In order to not be discovered, Eve
should take one more step to keep the counter-measurement
results normal. For this purpose, the wavelength dependent
character of fused biconical taper beam splitter is utilized to
nullify the protection measurement in the second part of the
scheme.
B. Attack Part 2
In this attack, Eve prepares and resends two extra coherent
state pulses with wavelengths different from the typical com-
munication wavelength of 1550 nm. One of them is modu-
lated the same polarization as the signal and the other with the
local oscillator. So that when they reach Bob’s side, one goes
into the signal path and the other goes into the local oscillator
path. Let us denote these pulses and also their intensities as
Is and I lo. Eve randomly chooses the wavelengths of Is and
I lo from one of the following two sets:
λs1 = 1410nm, T
s
1 = 0.4862,
λlo1 = 1490nm, T
lo
1 = 0.4873;
λs2 = 1310nm, T
s
2 = 0.5144,
λlo2 = 1590nm, T
lo
2 = 0.5155,
(2)
4where T ij (i = s, lo; j = 1, 2) denotes the transmittance of
the 50 : 50 fused biconical taper beam splitter corresponding
to the different wavelengths (see Table 1). As the transmit-
tances are deviated from 0.5, an extra differential current pro-
portional to the light intensity will appear in the final results.
When Bob applies strong attenuation (r1 ≈ 0) on the sig-
nal, the extra differential current is primarily contributed by
I lo. This extra contribution is equal to (2T lo1 −1)ηlo1 I lo1 ≡ Dlo1
or (2T lo2 − 1)ηlo2 I lo2 ≡ Dlo2 plus shot noise (cf. Eq. (A2) for
details), where ηloi denotes the detector efficiency correspond-
ing to the different wavelengths. As this contribution should
have zero statistical average and positive variance, Eve must
ensure that Dlo1 = −Dlo2 and choose I lo1 and I lo2 with equal
probability. In this case, the variance is approximately equal
to D2lo. Therefore Eve should make D2lo = (1 − 1/N)N0 for
Strategy A and D2lo = 1/3N0 for Strategy B, in order to make
the shot noise measurement results seem normal.
On the other hand, when Bob applies no attenuation (r2 ≈
1) on the signal, the extra differential current comes from both
I lo and Is. Similarly, the differential current introduced by
Is is (1 − 2T s1 )ηs1Is1 ≡ Ds1 or (1 − 2T s2 )ηs2Is2 ≡ Ds2 plus
shot noise. Eve makes Ds1 = −Ds2 and chooses Is1 and Is2
with equal probability. For convenience, we summarize the
notations defined above as follows:
Ds1 ≡ (1 − 2T s1 )ηs1Is1 ,
Dlo1 ≡ (2T lo1 − 1)ηlo1 I lo1 ,
Ds2 ≡ (1 − 2T s2 )ηs2Is2 ,
Dlo2 ≡ (2T lo2 − 1)ηlo2 I lo2 .
(3)
By making Ds1 = −Dlo1 = −Ds2 = Dlo2 ≡ D, the contri-
bution from Is will cancel the contribution from I lo except
for a small amount of shot noise, which keeps the influence to
the quadrature measurement results at an acceptable level. A
more rigorous analysis taking the shot noises into account is
described in Sec. IV and Appendix B.
IV. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze Bob’s estimated excess noise un-
der the two kinds of attacks proposed in Sec. III. For simplic-
ity, we take ηji = η = 0.5 (i = 1, 2; j = s, lo), r1 = 0.001,
r2 = 1 and the intensity of the local oscillator ILO = 108 (in
units of photo-electron number). Let us analyze the measure-
ment outcomes corresponding to I lo and Is.
First though, let us briefly review the method of estimat-
ing the excess noise in CV-QKD [22]. By denoting xˆ as
the quadrature modulated by Alice (XˆA or PˆA) and yˆ as the
quadrature measured by Bob (XˆB or PˆB), we note that
〈xˆ2〉 = VAN0, 〈xˆyˆ〉 = √ηηchVAN0,
〈yˆ2〉 = ηηch(VA + ξ)N0 +N0 + vel.
(4)
Here ηch is the channel transmittance, VAN0 is the modula-
tion variance, ξ is the excess noise, N0 is the shot noise, η
is the efficiency of homodyne detector and vel is the electric
noise (all expressed in their respective units). Among these
parameters, η and vel are pre-known as the system param-
eters, N0 is estimated by the local oscillator intensity from
N0 = ηILO , and the others are estimated from Alice and
Bob’s correlated variables (xi, yi)i=1,...,m. The excess noise
can then be estimated as
ξ = (〈yˆ2〉 − ηηchVAN0 −N0 − vel)/ηηchN0. (5)
In a later protection scheme given in Ref. [26], two attenu-
ation ratios, r1 and r2, are introduced on the signal path. Typ-
ically we set r1 = 0.001 for shot noise estimation and r2 = 1
for quadrature measurements. The variance of yˆ should be
expressed as
〈yˆ2〉1 ≡ Vs1 = r1ηηch(VA + ξ)N0 +N0 + vel
〈yˆ2〉2 ≡ Vs2 = r2ηηch(VA + ξ)N0 +N0 + vel.
(6)
We can then estimate the parameters by
N˜0 =
r2Vs1−r1Vs2
r2−r1 − vel,
ξ˜ = [ Vs2−Vs1(r2−r1)ηηch − VAN˜0]/N˜0.
(7)
From now on, we denote N0 ≡ ηILO as a constant value
(that is, the shot noise value when the system runs normally)
and N˜0 and ξ˜ as the estimation values. Let us now analyze
how large N˜0 and ξ˜ could be under the two different attack
strategies.
Strategy A: The differential current δˆitot at the output of
the homodyne detection can be considered as the summation
of δˆipart1 and δˆipart2, which present the contributions from
Part 1 and Part 2 of our attack scheme respectively. That
is, δˆitot,i = δˆipart1,i + δˆipart2,i, where the index i = 1, 2
denotes that Bob applies the attenuation ratio ri. In Strat-
egy A, δˆipart,i can be obtained (cf. Eq. (A3)) by taking
Xˆφ =
√
riηchN(XA + δXˆA + δXˆE), and its variance can
then be computed as
V Apart1,i = 〈(δˆipart1,i)2〉 − 〈δˆipart1,i〉2
= η
α2
LO
N [riηηchN(VA + 2) + 1] + riηηchξN0 + vel
= riηηch(VA + 2 + ξ)N0 +
N0
N + vel. (8)
For δˆipart2,i, we derive its variance in Appendix B (cf.
Eq. (B5)) as follows
Vpart2,i = (1− ri)2D2 + (35.81 + 35.47r2i )D. (9)
Thus the total variance is given by
V As,i = 〈(δˆitot)2〉 − 〈δˆitot〉2
= V Apart1,i + Vpart2,i
= riηηch(VA + 2 + ξ)N0 +
N0
N + vel
+ (1− ri)2D2 + (35.81 + 35.47r2i )D.
(10)
We can now get the estimations about the shot noise level and
excess noise under Strategy A to be
N˜0 = N0/N + (1 − r1r2)D2 + (35.81− 35.47r1r2)D,
ξ˜A = [(2 + ξ)N0 + (r1 + r2 − 2)D2/ηηch
+ 35.47(r1 + r2)D]/N˜0.
(11)
5By choosing proper intensities Is, I lo and N , Eve can make
N˜0 = N0 and ξ˜A arbitrary close to zero. For this purpose,
we take ηch = 0.9, for example. Assume ξ = 0.1, simple
calculations show that Eve can choose N = 20.9, Is1 = 5 ×
105, I lo1 = 5.4 × 105, Is2 = 4.8 × 105 and I lo2 = 4.4 × 105,
which are 3 orders of magnitude smaller than ILO .
Strategy B: As long as Eve can change the slope of the
homodyne detection response by calibrating the trigger time,
the excess noise ξ˜B will be close to zero. Let us assume the
realistic shot noise is γN0. It is easy to derive that
V Bpart1,i = γ[riηη
′
ch(VA + 2 + ξ) + 1]N0 + vel, (12)
and Vpart2,i is the same as in Strategy A. Here γ and η′ch are
parameters chosen by Eve, and she should make γη′ch = ηch
in order to keep the estimated parameters normal. Therefore
V Bs,i = γ[riηη
′
ch(VA + 2 + ξ) + 1]N0 + vel
+ (1 − ri)2D2 + (35.81 + 35.47r2i )D.
(13)
The shot noise level and excess noise under Attack 2 can then
be computed to give
N˜0 = γN0 + (1− r1r2)D2 + (35.81− 35.47r1r2)D,
ξ˜B = [(2 + ξ)N0 + VA(N0 − N˜0)
+ (r1 + r2 − 2)D2/ηηch + 35.47(r1 + r2)D]/N˜0.
(14)
By choosing proper intensities Is, I lo and N , Eve can make
N˜0 = N0 and ξ˜B arbitrarily close to zero. Let us take ηch =
0.5 and ξ = 0.1, for example. Again a simple calculation
shows that, by choosing γ = 0.47, Is1 = 3.72 × 105, I lo1 =
4.04 × 105, Is2 = 3.56 × 105 and I lo2 = 3.31 × 105, we
again get about 3 orders of magnitude smaller than ILO as in
Strategy A.
Finally, we note that the intensities of the pulses in Part 2
will affect the local oscillator intensity measurement. This ef-
fect is small due to the low strength of the pulses in Part 2, and
Eve can fully compensate it by decreasing the local oscillator
intensity in Part 1 and carefully calibrating the trigger time.
V. COUNTERMEASURE: IMPROVEMENT OF THE
REAL-TIME SHOT NOISE MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE
In the former proposed scheme in the real-time shot noise
measurement regime [26], only two attenuation ratios r1 ≈ 0
and r2 = 1 are applied on the signal path, and we have already
shown that this is not enough to detect the wavelength attack.
In fact, in that case, according to Eqs. (10) and (13), the total
noise N(r) can be written as a second-order polynomial of the
attenuation ratio r:
N(r) = r2 Var(Xs) + r(ηηchξ − 2Cov(Xs, Xlo))
+ (N0 + vel +Var(Xlo)),
(15)
where Xs (Xlo) is the signal on the detection caused by the
attack signal going through the signal path (local oscillator
path). The shot noise measurement procedure in Ref. [26]
assumes that V (r) is a linear function of r and this is why
it is defeated by the wavelength attack, which uses the term
Cov(Xs, Xlo) to compensate for the terms Var(Xs) and
Var(Xlo) when r = 1.
The countermeasure can be modified to thwart the wave-
length attack by allowing Bob to use a third attenuation ratio,
thereby observing N(r) for three values of r. This way the
three coefficients a, b, c of the polynomialV (r) = ar2+br+c
can be obtained. The coefficient a in front of r2 should be 0 in
an ideal setting. To avoid the wavelength attack, it is enough
that Alice and Bob ensure that a≪ c. Indeed, in that case,
Var(Xs)≪ N0 +Var(Xlo),
hence,
Var(Xs)≪ Var(Xlo),
(since Var(Xlo) is not small compared to N0). As a re-
sult, Cov(Xs, Xlo) ≤
√
Var(Xs)Var(Xlo) ≪ Var(Xlo),
and it is not possible anymore to compensate Var(Xlo) with
Cov(Xs, Xlo).
For instance, Bob can randomly apply attenuation ratios
r1 = 1, r2 = 0.5 and r3 = 0.001 to the amplitude modu-
lator, with probabilities of 90%, 5% and 5% respectively. As
has been pointed out in Ref. [26], this countermeasure has an
impact on the overall key rate since some pulses are attenu-
ated. In our example, assuming that 10% of the pulses that are
attenuated are discarded, the final key rate is the same as in
Ref. [26].
It is worth noting that applying randomly several attenua-
tion ratios on Bob’s side allows us to check the transmittance
linearity with respect to the attenuation ratio in the same way
as we do for the noise. This allows us for instance to defeat
saturation attacks [31] that rely on non-linearities of the de-
tection apparatus. Therefore this countermeasure defeats all
currently known attacks on the detection apparatus of Gaus-
sian CVQKD, and is expected to constitute a strong defense
against variants of these attacks.
In addition to the procedure above, physical countermea-
sures such as adding wavelength filters before detection (to
ensure that the wavelengths used for the attacks are close to
the system wavelength, which forces the attacker to use high-
power signals), and a monitoring of the local oscillator inten-
sity (to detect these high-power signals) are also suggested.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we proposed two strategies to realize a wave-
length attack targeting a practical CV-QKD system using ho-
modyne detection. By inserting light pulses at different wave-
lengths, with intensities lower than the local oscillator light
by three orders of magnitude, Eve can bias the shot noise and
the excess noise estimated by Alice and Bob. In other words,
Eve can tap all of the secure key information without being
discovered. The real-time shot noise measurement scheme as
proposed in Ref. [26] cannot detect this type of attack. How-
ever, it can be improved by using three attenuation ratios to
6successfully fix this security loophole. Moreover, other phys-
ical countermeasures, such as adding additional wavelength
filters and monitoring the local oscillator intensity, are also
suggested.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Model of Homodyne Detection
When a signal, described by the annihilation operator aˆ, is
inserted to a photodetector with an efficiency of η, the mea-
sured annihilation operator becomes bˆ = √ηaˆ + √1− ηaˆv ,
where aˆv denotes the vacuum mode. The input photons are
converted to an electric current with strength iˆ = qbˆ†bˆ, where
q is a constant amplification factor and iˆ represents the number
of electrons. Without loss of generality, we set q = 1 for sim-
plicity. The model of homodyne detection is shown in Fig. 3.
FIG. 3: (Color online) Schematic of the basics of homodyne detec-
tion. See text for details.
Here we assume that the transmittance of the beam splitter is
T , the photocurrents recorded by the photodetectors can be
written as follows (where the electric noise is not considered)
iˆ1 = [
√
η(e−iφ
√
T aˆ†LO −
√
1− T aˆ†s) +
√
1− ηaˆ†v1]×
[
√
η(eiφ
√
T aˆLO −
√
1− T aˆs) +
√
1− ηaˆv1],
iˆ2 = [
√
η(e−iφ
√
1− T aˆ†LO +
√
T aˆ†s) +
√
1− ηaˆ†v2]×
[
√
η(eiφ
√
1− T aˆLO +
√
T aˆs) +
√
1− ηaˆv2],
(A1)
where φ ∈ {0, pi/2} is switchable and controlled by Bob. We
note that aˆs can be linearized and written as αs + δaˆs and
aˆLO can be written as αLO + δaˆLO, where δaˆs and δaˆLO
can be considered as the annihilation operators of the vacuum
state [32]. For simplicity, let us assume that αLO is a real
number. To derive the quadratures Xˆ and Pˆ , the difference of
the two photocurrents should be measured:
δˆi = iˆ2 − iˆ1
= η[(1− 2T )aˆ†LOaˆLO
+ 2
√
T (1− T )(e−iφaˆ†LOaˆs + eiφaˆLOaˆ†s) + (2T − 1)aˆ†saˆs]
+
√
η(1 − η)[√T (e−iφaˆ†LOaˆv1 + eiφaˆLOaˆ†v1)
+
√
1− T (e−iφaˆ†LOaˆv2 + eiφaˆLOaˆ†v2)]
≃ √ηαLO[(2T − 1)√η(αLO + δXˆLO)
+ 2
√
T (1− T )√η(Xφ + δXˆφ)
+
√
(1− η)(
√
TXˆv1 +
√
1− TXˆv2)],
(A2)
where Xφ ≡ αse−iφ + α∗seiφ, δXˆLO ≡ δaˆLO + δaˆ†LO and
δXˆφ ≡ δaˆse−iφ + δaˆ†seiφ. Here δXˆφ, Xˆv1 and Xˆv2 are irrel-
evant vacuum states with a normalized variance of 1. When
φ = 0 (or pi/2) we recover the quadratures Xˆ (or Pˆ ) from
Xφ, respectively. The approximation comes from the fact that
αs ≪ αLO. By setting T = 0.5, we have
δˆi =
√
ηαLO(
√
ηXφ +
√
ηδXˆφ +
√
1− η Xˆv1+Xˆv2√
2
)
=
√
ηαLOXˆ
φ
Bob (A3)
which is called balanced homodyne detection. Bob can cal-
culate the variance of XˆφBob from δˆi by V
φ
B = 〈δˆi
2〉 =
ηα2LO〈(XˆφBob)2〉 = ηVφN0 +N0, where N0 ≡ ηα2LO is used
as the shot noise unit and Vφ ≡ 〈X2φ〉 is the variance of Xφ in
shot noise units.
In general, we can calculate the variance of δˆi as
〈δˆi2〉 = η2α4LO(2T − 1)2 + η2α2LO(2T − 1)2〈δXˆ2LO〉
+ 4η2α2LOT (1− T )(〈X2φ〉+ 〈δXˆ2φ〉)
+ η(1− η)α2LO[T 〈Xˆ2v1〉+ (1 − T )〈Xˆ2v2〉]
= η2α4LO(2T − 1)2 + ηα2LO[1− η + η(2T − 1)2]
+ 4η2α2LOT (1− T )(〈X2φ〉+ 1)
(A4)
Finally, the differential current introduced by excess noise and
electric noise should be added [33]. Hence, the total output
current is δˆitot = δˆi+ δˆiξ + δˆiel with a variance of 〈δˆi
2
tot〉 =
〈δˆi2〉+ 〈δˆi2ξ〉+ 〈δˆi
2
el〉 = 〈δˆi
2〉+ ηξN0 + vel.
7Appendix B: Analysis of the Attack Part 2 Excess Noise
According to Eq. (A2), the differential currents introduced
by I lo and Is are
δˆilo = η(2T
lo
j − 1)I loj +
√
ηI loj
[(
2T loj − 1
)√
ηδXˆ loj
+ 2
√
T loj (1 − T loj )
√
ηδXˆφ1
+
√
(1 − η)
(√
T loj Xˆv1 +
√
1− T loj Xˆv2
)]
= Dloj + Sˆ
lo
j ,
δˆis = η(1 − 2T sj )Isj +
√
ηIsj
[(
1− 2T sj
)√
ηδXˆsj
− 2
√
T sj (1− T sj )
√
ηδXˆφ2
−
√
(1 − η)
(√
T sj Xˆv3 +
√
1− T sj Xˆv4
)]
= Dsj + Sˆ
s
j ,
(B1)
where Sˆloj and Sˆsj denote the shot noise terms and j = 1 or
2 corresponds to the random choices. Let us denote the sum-
mation of these two contributions for attenuation ratio ri by
δˆipart2,i = δˆilo + riδˆis (i = 1, 2). The variance of δˆipart2,i
can be computed by
Vpart2,i = 〈δˆi
2
part2,i〉 − 〈δˆipart2,i〉2
= 〈(Dloj + riDsj + Sˆloj + riSˆsj )2〉 − 0
= 〈(Dloj + riDsj)2〉+ 〈(Sˆloj )2〉+ 〈(riSˆsj )2〉
= 〈(−Dsj + riDsj )2〉
+ η〈I loj [η(2T loj − 1)2 + 4ηT loj (1− T loj ) + 1− η]〉
+ ηr2i 〈Isj [η(1− 2T sj )2 + 4ηT sj (1 − T sj ) + 1− η]〉
= (1− ri)2D2 + η〈I loj 〉+ ηr2i 〈Isj 〉,
(B2)
where we have used the conditions proposed in Sec. III, which
can be rearranged as Ds1 = −Ds2 = −Dlo1 = Dlo2 = D. Inj
can be expressed in terms of Dnj (n = s, lo; j = 1, 2) from
their definitions (cf. Eq. (3)). That is,
η〈I loj 〉 = η2I lo1 + η2I lo2
= η2
Dlo
1
η(2T lo
1
−1) +
η
2
Dlo
2
η(2T lo
2
−1)
= 35.81D,
(B3)
ηr2i 〈Isj 〉 = r2i (η2Is1 + η2Is2 )
= r2i (
η
2
Ds
1
η(1−2T s
1
) +
η
2
Ds
2
η(1−2T s
2
) )
= 35.47r2iD.
(B4)
For getting the real numbers, we have substituted T s1 , T lo1 , T s2
and T lo2 by their values according to Eq. (2). Therefore, we
finally get
Vpart2,i = (1− ri)2D2 + (35.81 + 35.47r2i )D. (B5)
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